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Definition:  
‘Speculation’ originally meant ‘reflective observation’. It came to mean ‘conjecture’ or ‘mere 
conjecture’ as philosophers strove for certainty, consecrating science as rigorously acquired knowledge 
accumulated through application of the scientific method and devalued the cognitive status of other 
discourses. The present conventional meaning of speculation, where the place of observation has 
disappeared, is a by-product of this consecration. In this entry I show how through efforts to defend the 
status of these other discourses, the original meaning of ‘speculation’ was not only revived but built 
upon by speculative philosophers. They showed that speculation is primordial to all experience and 
thinking, with past speculations embodied in language as ‘dead’ metaphors. Revealing the possibility 
of elaborating alternative metaphors frees us not only from these dead metaphors to overcome the dead-
ends of current science, opening up new possibilities for enquiry, but the possibility of reconceiving 
ourselves and our place in nature. In this way, speculation makes it possible to transform ourselves, 
creating radically new ways of living and new forms of life. On this view, speculation, by opening new 
possibilities, could free us from the destructive trajectories of current civilization.  
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Historical context 
Currently, ‘speculation’ is taken to mean conjecturing without conclusive evidence, or the activity 
of proposing possible answers to questions based on limited knowledge or information. Tacitly, 
speculation is counterposed to knowledge based of practical experience, rigorous observation or 
rigorous reasoning and is defined as inferior to these and not to be taken seriously. This everyday usage 
can be regarded as common sense, but it has not come to us through the evolution of common-sense. It 
is the product of a long history of philosophical disputes ramifying through the entire culture of Western 
civilization. The current meaning of ‘speculation’ is inextricably linked to other concepts that also have 
gained their current meaning through equally long histories of philosophical disputes. The concepts of 
evidence, knowledge and information are obvious examples. The word ‘speculation’ has its origins in 
the Latin ‘speculum’ which meant mirror, reflection and reflective consciousness, and late Latin 
‘speculationem’ which meant contemplation or observation with the root ‘spek’ coming from the proto-
Indian-European, meaning ‘to observe’. So, originally ‘speculation’ meant ‘reflective observation’. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the original English word meant ‘To look or gaze at 
(something); to examine, inspect, or observe closely or narrowly’ or ‘To observe or view mentally; to 
consider, examine, or reflect upon with close attention; to contemplate; to theorize upon.’ In the mid-
fifteenth century ‘speculation’ was taken to mean the pursuit of the truth by means of thinking, or 
thinking or meditating on a subject. Evidently, the place accorded to observation in speculation 
gradually dropped out. It was only later that ‘conjecture’ became central to the concept, and only from 
the late sixteenth century that speculation gained its disparaging sense of ‘mere conjecture’. 
This disparaging sense gained momentum with the Seventeenth Century scientific revolution and 
the quest for absolute foundations for knowledge and absolute certainty, whether through reason 
associated with mathematics, deductive thinking modelled on mathematical reasoning, or on what is 
immediately given to the senses. Most importantly, this revolution was associated with the 
differentiation of scientific knowledge from all other kinds of knowledge. This claim for scientific 
knowledge was consolidated in the Nineteenth Century through Auguste Comte’s positivism and in the 
Twentieth Century through logical empiricism, and more specifically, logical positivism. Logical 
empiricism was founded on empiricism and the newly developed symbolic logic, and effort to provide 
absolute foundations for mathematics either through logic or through precisely defined formal rules of 
manipulation of symbols. Certainty could be achieved through a combination of induction and 
deduction. What was seen to be most important in theories is that they generated predictions that could 
be verified. Science was seen to advance by the development of more general theories able to deduce 
more particular theories as special cases, implying a deterministic universe. The successful application 
of science to technology was a further way of validating scientific knowledge. While logical positivism 
has been severely critiqued in philosophy, it retains its hold on culture as justifying ‘scientism’, the 
belief that only science gives us real knowledge. Rather than sense experience or observational 
statements, it is common now to think that knowledge is certain because it is grounded in data, or 
information, allowing some role to conjectures in developing knowledge, providing these are not merely 
speculative and conform to measurements or statistical analysis of data. It is in this context that the 
pejorative sense of speculation has gained the status of ‘common sense’.  
Such scientism has always faced opposition. The first major challenge to this conception of 
knowledge came from Giambattista Vico. Vico was proposing a New Science, characterized as 
‘Speculative Geometry of the Civil World’, but essentially, he was upholding and greatly advancing 
the humanities and the traditions of rhetoric and history. Arguing that we can know the truths of 
geometry because we ourselves created it, he argued that the human world can be understood in its 
historical development because we created it. Because we did not create nature, we cannot really 
understand it.  
Philosophers in Germany offered the strongest defence of speculation, however. Kant was their main 
point of departure. Like Vico, Kant argued that we can truly understand only that which we ourselves 
have created, with mathematics taken as a model for this. However, Kant also argued that all we 
experience is in some sense our creation, produced by synthetic thinking involving imagination, forms 
of intuition (space and time) and the categories of the understanding. What we observe is guided by 
questions formulated in terms of these concepts. Kant’s critical philosophy aimed to defend such 
conceptual knowledge, along with the principles of practical reason and aesthetic judgements of taste. 
This was neither analytic nor empirical knowledge, but synthetic a priori knowledge. Such knowledge 
would seem to require some form of speculative imagination to account for it. In Critique of Pure 
Reason (1996, A635f. and B663f., p.612) Kant considered but rejected this, characterizing speculation 
as a fruitless theoretical exercise in which cognition aims at an object, or concepts of an object, of which 
one cannot gain any experience. He invoked dialectics, but merely to show that it is impossible to choose 
between rival doctrines on issues central to traditional speculative philosophy.  
This provoked a reaction, and it was through this reaction that speculation came to be strongly 
defended. Typically, G.W.F. Hegel defended speculative philosophy through dialectics. Dialectics as 
conceived by Hegel, under the influence of both Kant and Plato, has a negative side, as the way to 
expose one-sidedness of abstract propositions of understanding and how these necessarily veer into 
their opposites. Speculative philosophy was defended by Hegel (1975, §81, p.115ff.) as the ‘positive’ 
or speculative side of dialectics. It is the process of overcoming contradiction, one-sidedness, and 
differences to achieve more comprehensive knowledge, including self-knowledge.  In the Preface to his 
Phenomenology of Spirit  (1977, §61, p.38), Hegel examined the claim to be able to ground knowledge 
on a foundation of sense-certainty, revealing this claim to be one-sidedness, leading through 
successively less one-sided ‘solutions’ to the conclusion that ‘knowledge’ cannot be treated in 
abstraction from self-understanding achieved through world-history. Building on the Socratic question 
that allows us to bring any aspect of experience before the mind and consider its being and meaning, he 
introduced the notion of the ‘speculative sentence’. While the Socratic question makes the mind 
dialectical, allowing it to move from one question to another, the speculative sentence, as interpreted 
by Donald Verene (2009, p.ix), ‘turns this series back on itself, revealing its pattern of self-
development.’ As Verene noted, (p.x) ‘speculation excludes neither reflection nor analysis’ but is the 
‘logic of question and answer that is the key to philosophy, far more than argument. Anyone can argue, 
but few can ask the right questions.’ While reflection and argument operate at a distance from the object, 
‘[t]o speculate … is … to narrate the inner life of the object.’ (p.3) As a speculative philosopher, Hegel 
was concerned to provide a systematic and comprehensive understanding of human existence and its 
place in the cosmos, encompassing the natural sciences, history, literature and art, and revealing the 
possibility for freedom in how we live and organize society. 
Hegel defended a form of Idealism, claiming that nature itself is a product of Spirit. Our knowledge 
of nature only reveals Spirit in nature. Idealism was common to many other philosophers opposing 
scientism. Subsequently, most philosophers abandoned Idealism, and along with it, speculative 
philosophy, and its quest for comprehensive understanding. Philosophy was then riven by the 
opposition between those with a primary allegiance to science conceived of as having found the way to 
acquire certain knowledge of reality, as with most analytic philosophers, or to the humanities often 
sympathetic to some form of Idealism. This opposition did not exhaust the traditions of philosophy, 
however. Other traditions, including most Marxists, pragmatists and many phenomenologists, extolled 
practical knowledge over speculation. In some cases, these philosophers aligned themselves with 
science, as with orthodox Marxists, in others, with the humanities, as with humanist Marxists, 
hermeneutic philosophers and ordinary language philosophers. Either way, these philosophers also 
tended to dismiss speculative philosophy. The combination of scientism with the privileging of action 
over speculation led to the identification of knowledge with techno-science and the assumption that all 
true knowledge shows us how to control the world, including people, more efficiently. The only 
possibilities for the future are those which will be delivered by technology. 
However, some speculative philosophers embraced naturalism, although often without being 
recognized for doing so. This was the case with Friedrich Schelling who explicitly rejected Idealism. 
They can best be characterized as speculative naturalists, upholding the ambitions of speculative 
philosophy and the conception of humans as essentially creative as defended by speculative Idealists, 
while holding that nature preceded humanity, and humanity emerged and evolved as participants in a 
creative nature. Aligning themselves with the humanities, they challenged the characterization of 
science by its rationalist and empiricist defenders and their claims that science achieves indubitable 
knowledge, and following from this, challenged prevailing scientific theories. Embracing Kant’s 
argument that all our knowledge of the world is organized by imagination and concepts, but rejecting 
his claim to have shown that only one set of concepts are coherent and thereby valid, they argued that 
existing concepts could be transcended. Attacking Newtonian science, for making sentient life and mind 
unintelligible, Schelling outlined a speculative physics that could replace Newtonian physics, revealing 
new possibilities for science that had a major influenced on subsequent developments in physics, 
chemistry and biology. (Gare, 2011)  
Speculative naturalism was later revived and advanced by C.S. Peirce, Henri Bergson and Alfred 
North Whitehead and their followers. Whitehead launched a particularly strong defence of speculative 
philosophy or metaphysics. While this tradition of speculative naturalism was eclipsed by logical 
empiricism and phenomenology within mainstream philosophy, and later by structuralism and 
poststructuralism, the ideas of these philosophers were kept alive among philosophers of science and 
sympathetic scientists. In demolishing logical positivism in the third quarter of the Twentieth Century 
philosophers of science further developed their arguments, showing the central role for speculation in 
science itself. This again aligned science with the humanities, and along with granting a place to 
speculation in science, also gave a place to speculation in transforming humanity and creating the future. 
As with Schelling, these philosophers provided the means to defend the ideas of Vico and the 
speculative Idealists on naturalistic foundations. It is this tradition of philosophy that provides a real 
challenge to the denigration of speculation, and it is through their work that what is speculation can be 
characterized and defended and shown to be central to science as well as the humanities and everyday, 
practical life. Work in speculative philosophy or metaphysics has also been strongly supported within 
the natural sciences by theoretical scientists striving to overcome the heritage of Newtonian science and 
its implicit assumptions, and the failures of more recent physics. Such work has helped inspire what has 
been called the speculative turn in recent philosophy associated with speculative realism, speculative 
materialism and speculative naturalism, with a revived interest in Schelling (Levi, Srnicek and Harman, 
2011; Gare, 2011). 
What is speculation 
It is in the context of the original meaning of speculation, the change of meaning associated with the 
quest for certain knowledge, and then the reaction to this by speculative philosophers, that its nature 
and significance can be understood. To begin with, the tendency to exclude observation from the 
meaning of speculation and then defining it as being in some way inferior to observation should be 
rejected. Speculation begins in reflective observation. Later efforts to revive and defend speculation 
have revealed new dimensions to such reflective observation.  
Speculation potentially brings everything into question, beginning with appearances and beliefs, 
methods of inquiry and knowledge of methods for acquiring and ascertaining claims to knowledge, and 
more fundamentally, the concepts which define domains for investigation and conceptions of subjects 
able to speculate. Speculation is not necessarily philosophical speculation; however, reflective 
observation challenges one-sided thinking and if pursued long enough, almost inevitable leads to 
speculative metaphysics, or to sympathy for it. Whitehead (1933) characterized philosophy itself as ‘an 
attitude of mind towards doctrines ignorantly entertained’ and in defending speculative philosophy 
argued: 
No science can be more secure than the unconscious metaphysics which tacitly it 
presupposes. The individual thing is necessarily a modification of its environment, 
and cannot be understood in disjunction. All reasoning, apart from some 
metaphysical reference, is vicious. Thus the Certainties of Science are a delusion. 
They are hedged around with unexplored limitations. Our handling of scientific 
doctrines is controlled by the diffused metaphysical concepts of our epoch. Even so, 
we are continually led into errors of expectation. Also, whenever some new mode 
of observational experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog of 
inaccuracies. (p.154) 
Disparaging speculation involves denial of this, claiming that there is an indubitable ground or method 
underpinning knowledge that is beyond questioning. Speculation in its broadest sense brings into 
question all claims to certainty and is radically opposed to such dogmatism, including dogmatic 
scepticism.  
That is, for the defenders of speculative philosophy, speculation is not separate from other realms of 
discourse that can achieve certainty, let alone an inferior discourse. All discourses are based on 
assumptions that are questionable. Speculative thinking acknowledges this explicitly, not only about 
itself, but also about other discourses and activities. Speculative philosophy is not self-contained but 
exists through constantly engaging with other discourses, activities and forms of life, brings the 
assumptions of these into question, revealing the possibility of replacing them. Particular issues or 
entities can be focussed on, but by the very nature of this must lead to questioning of the boundaries 
defining these issues or entities. Questioning inevitably leads to the crossing of disciplinary boundaries 
and then to philosophy in its original sense as love of wisdom, associated with the quest for a 
comprehensive understanding of the cosmos in all its complexity and our place within it. Beyond 
questioning, speculative philosophy proposes new ways of conceiving the world, providing new 
insights, opening up new avenues of inquiry, new research programs, new projects for action and the 
possibility of new forms of life.  
The difficulty in characterizing what is involved in such speculation is evident not only in the 
differences between different philosophers, but from Whitehead’s claim (1929, p.51) that ‘speculative 
Reason is in its essence untrammelled by method. Its function is to pierce into the general reasons 
beyond limited reasons, to understand all methods as coordinated in a nature of things only to be grasped 
by transcending all method.’ This can never be finally achieved. As Whitehead continued, ‘This infinite 
ideal is never to be attained by the bounded intelligence of mankind.’ Speculation is best characterized 
through its history, although it has to be recognized that any portrayal of it is itself provisional with the 
potential to be transcended. However, as noted with reference to Hegel, the revived defence of 
speculation in Germany following Kant was inextricably linked with the notion of dialectics, and it is 
relation to dialectics that it be best characterized. Dialectics itself has been characterized in different 
ways, however. This is not a problem since thinking dialectically involves taking anywhere as a starting 
point and through critique and considering then developing alternatives, moving to more adequate 
characterizations of that which is being investigated. For Plato, dialectics was the art of conversation in 
pure thinking. German speculative philosophers built on Kant’s use of the term ‘dialectics’ but rejected 
his characterization of dialectical arguments as sterile, never able to reach conclusions. While 
incorporating Kant’s insights on imagination and concepts they used Plato’s notion of dialectics to 
reconceive it as creative.  
Fichte, and then following him, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Schelling, regarded their work as 
speculative because along with experience of sensible objects and the concepts required to cognize them 
they gave a place to a third kind of experience – experience of the development of  cognition and then 
appreciating the adequacy or otherwise of concepts used to interpret experience. Fichte embraced 
Kant’s argument that there is a synthetic component to all our experience and judgements, involving 
imagination and construction, but went beyond Kant to argue that we can explain concepts as the 
emerging through the organism’s practical engagement in the world, and that synthesis also makes 
possible speculative knowledge, knowledge of how old concepts could be brought into question and 
new concepts and conceptual frameworks elaborated to replace these. In characterizing this process, 
‘synthesis’ was used by Fichte to reformulate dialectics as a dialectical synthetic method. It involves 
revealing contradiction or vicious circularities in previously derived sets of propositions and then 
seeking out some new higher principle that allows one to avoid the contradiction or circularity, and is 
therefore declared ‘necessary’.  There can be no algorithm for solving such problems. Every such 
problem must be dealt with in its own terms, each requiring a fresh exercise in creative problem solving. 
This is not conceptual analysis, logical inference or syllogistic reasoning, nor is it empirical observation, 
but is thoroughly synthetic. It cannot be derived from the problematic set of concepts it resolves but is 
a product of imaginative thinking.  
Hegel’s reformulation of this dialectic involves three steps: taking a view, belief, concept or category 
as fixed, then reflecting on this to reveal what is implicit within it, but also, to reveal its abstractness 
and one-sidedness and one or more contradictions. This is followed by a speculative step of positive 
reason in which a higher stage is reached which embraces earlier beliefs, concepts or categories to 
achieve a more concrete, because less one-sided perspective. However, Hegel only gave an attenuated 
place to imaginative thinking. The later work in Logic was criticised by Schelling for geometrizing the 
dialectic, failing to acknowledge the creativity and openness of dialectics which, Schelling claimed, can 
never be completed.  
Building on Plato’s, Hegel’s and Fichte’s notions of dialectics, Schelling went on to challenge 
Newtonian science to align science with history and art. Thought, including thought associated with 
practical engagement in the world, is inherently synthetic, Schelling argued, and begins with genuine 
opposition either between thought and something opposing it, or other factors within thought. This 
necessitates a new synthetic moment that can be treated as a product or factor in the next level of 
development. Building on Kant’s and Fichte’s ascription of a central place to imagination in such 
synthesis, Schelling developed Kant’s concept of construction and extended Fichte’s genetic approach 
from the development of cognition to the development of the whole of nature. He characterized 
‘intellectual intuition’ as a form of knowledge gained through a reflective and imaginative 
experimentation and construction by the productive imagination of the sequence of forms produced by 
the procreative causality of what is unconditioned (the ‘Absolute’). Referring to this dialectic as the 
‘standpoint of production’ in contrast to the Kantian ‘standpoint of reflection’, Schelling sought to show 
not only the social conditions for objective knowledge (as with Hegel), but the nature of the world that 
enables it to be known objectively and explained while at the same time producing life and subjects that 
can achieve knowledge of it and of themselves. In doing so he gave a place to will as well as constructive 
imagination in the production of truth. This in essence is the whole project of Naturphilosophie, or 
speculative naturalism.  
This work on speculation and dialectics was enormously influential, but later developments of these 
ideas were fragmented, and often made no mention of speculation, or dialectics. Schleiermacher, a 
contemporary of Hegel and Schelling and strongly influenced by Schelling, lectured on dialectics and 
intended to produce a work on this as his magnum opus, but died before he could write it. He is now 
known principally for having inspired the development of hermeneutics. While work on hermeneutics 
should be seen as advancing our understanding of dialectics and speculation, especially in the case of 
Paul Ricoeur, these terms were not used. Karl Marx and the Marxists also developed dialectics. 
However, Marx’s dialectics influenced by both Hegel and Schelling was primarily critical, and 
Friedrich Engels’ dialectics formulated as three laws was fundamentally undialectical. Both tended to 
extoll praxis as superior to speculative thinking. The identification of dialectics with Marxism had the 
unfortunate consequence that the term ‘dialectics’ was dropped from the vocabulary of philosophers 
who did not want to be identified with Marxism, just as the identification of speculative philosophy 
with Idealism led other philosophers to avoid the term ‘speculation’. Speculative dialectics had its most 
significant impact on work in the philosophy of science, and here that it was best defended, but it was 
not identified as such.  
Speculation and the philosophy of science   
While major scientists continued the Schellingian tradition of speculative naturalism, freeing 
themselves from the assumptions of Newtonian science, reflections on science itself came to be 
dominated by the development of symbolic logic, that is, logic incorporating algebraic methods of 
reasoning developed in mathematics. This culminated in the development of logical empiricism and 
logical positivism emphasising the importance of deductive logic, giving some place to inductive logic, 
and no place to speculation. However, some of the most important logicians rebelled against this and 
did defend speculation, most importantly, C.S. Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead. 
Influenced by Kant, Hegel and Schelling and a scientist himself, Peirce as a logician argued that 
along with deduction and induction, there is also ‘abduction’. This is another name for speculative 
reasoning, while Peirce’s characterization of the circular relationship between these three forms of 
reasoning is really a further development of work in dialectics. For Peirce, abduction is the most 
important form of thinking, exemplified by Kepler’s explaining the observation of the observed 
positions of planets by postulating elliptical orbits. He was interested not only in particular scientific 
theories and defended metaphysical speculation, arguing that without reflection on metaphysics 
scientists are dominated by crude, unexamined forms of metaphysics. Abductive thinking is 
‘ampliative’, that is, creative. Although not fully developing the idea, Peirce held such thinking to be 
metaphorical. He noted (1998, p.392): ‘Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric of 
metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical … concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For 
a pure idea without metaphor … is an onion without a peel.’ Deduction as ‘necessary reasoning’ has a 
place in working out the implications of ideas postulated through abduction, and observations are made 
on the basis of questions posed in terms of such ideas.  
It was Whitehead, however, who focussed explicitly on defending speculative philosophy. His 
contribution to understanding speculation was obscured by his claim that it has no method. Seen against 
the background of the history of speculative dialectics, however, it becomes apparent that Whitehead 
was part of this tradition and making a number of important contributions to it. When it came to 
proposing new ideas or theories, he claimed a method of descriptive generalization, meaning 'the 
utilization of specific notions, applying to a restricted group of facts, for the divination of the generic 
notions which apply to all facts.’ (Whitehead, 1978, p.5) Although he seldom used the term, he also 
was invoking the use of metaphors. He showed what is involved in elaborating and extending such 
theories by committing oneself to them, striving to show how they can be applied first in one case, and 
then in all other cases. He observed the difficulty of avoiding blind spots in any speculative 
metaphysical scheme and argued that it is only through having rival schemes that the limitations of each 
could be revealed. 
While the philosophies of Peirce and Whitehead were marginalized by logical empiricism, 
phenomenology, and ordinary language philosophy, from the 1950’s onwards their ideas were 
resurrected by historically oriented philosophers of science. Norwood Russell Hanson revived Peirce’s 
work on abduction in his work on patterns of discovery. Thomas Kuhn was strongly influenced by both 
Hanson and the historian of science, James Conant, who in turn had been strongly influenced by 
Whitehead. Later philosophers of science extended and refined their work. Most importantly, they 
examined the role of metaphors in science. Mary Hesse and Rom Harré were involved in this, but the 
most profound insights on metaphors came from Mark Johnson and George Lakoff. Johnson defined 
his own work as a development of Kant’s philosophy; however, his doctoral thesis was supervised by 
Ricoeur, and in transcending Kant’s philosophy his work mirrored the earlier transition from Kantian 
critical philosophy to speculative dialectics. Lakoff then showed how mathematics itself is based on the 
elaboration of metaphors. Johnson and Lakoff together showed that language is largely composed of 
metaphors and metonyms, evidencing the speculative element in all our thinking, and experiencing. 
Despite not defining this as the study of dialectics or speculation, work on metaphor has greatly 
advanced our understanding of speculation and its significance. 
Summary: speculation and the possible 
Freed by the proponents of speculative philosophy and post-positivist philosophy of science from 
the distorting claims scientism, we can now recover the original meaning of speculation as reflective 
observation, enriched by the work of these philosophers. Peirce’s notion of abduction provides the most 
useful starting point. This is the dimension of reasoning left out by logical empiricists in their 
characterization of valid reasoning, and from Peirce’s perspective, it is the most important part of 
reasoning. Abduction is not simply a matter of deductive necessity nor of making provisional 
extrapolations on the basis of observed regularities, nor a combination of them, while deduction and 
induction presuppose previous abductive inferences. These are in the form of metaphors, beginning 
with metaphors that have congealed into the background, habitual assumptions as dead metaphors, or 
new metaphors. Speculative enquiry begins with questioning these previously taken for granted ways 
of perceiving and interpreting experience, making explicit the metaphors underlying them and making 
it possible to replace them. One of the most important challenges is to ask the right questions. The next 
step is to explore alternative ways of interpreting or conceiving that which is being questioned, and it 
here that more creative thought is required. It is here that the deployment, development and utilizing of 
new metaphors to overcome contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes, blind spots and one-sidedness 
in past beliefs and interpretations of experience becomes important. Then comes the difficult process 
of articulating these metaphors into coherent frameworks of concepts and elucidating experience 
through them. To avoid blind-spots, it is necessary to entertain other possible ways of making sense of 
that which is being examined and choose between them. This is a dialectical process which also grants 
a place to deduction and induction, but always understood in relation to abduction. No phase of this is 
easy or straightforward, and there is no ultimate finality in inquiry. Speculative thinking exposes one-
sided thinking and leads beyond particular situations and problems and ultimately brings into question 
the deepest assumptions of science, philosophy and civilization, and constructs of alternatives in the 
unending quest for insight and a coherent, comprehensive understanding of the world. 
Acknowledging speculation in this sense supports Vico’s claim that humanity is largely self-
creating. Through speculation, not only are new possibilities for research opened up as taken for granted 
assumptions are brought into question and radically new concepts and ways of thinking developed, but 
new possibilities for society, civilization and humanity are created. We can reconceive our conceptions 
of ourselves, our relations to each other and to other life-forms, not only theoretically, but practically, 
envisaging and thereby creating new possibilities for the future, transforming the way we live, the way 
we organize and how we engage with the rest of nature. As Mikhail Epstein (2012, p.7) argued, humans   
create   themselves   by   creating  ‘new   images,  signs   and   concepts   of   themselves ... humans  do  
not  so  much  discover  something  in  the  world  of  objects as  build their very subjectivity by way of 
self-description and self-projection.’ Speculation frees us from the assumption that we are condemned 
by human nature to continue on our current paths, no matter how disastrous the consequences. 
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